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1. Introduction 
 
Sydney’s smart card ticketing system, the Opal card, was introduced in a phased approach from 2013 
to late 2014, replacing Sydney’s existing paper-based ticketing system as the primary ticketing system 
for the public transport system. The Opal card is similar in concept to those of other systems in use in 
public transport around the world including London’s Oyster card and Hong Kong’s Octopus cards but 
with some differences to the fare structure. In common with other smart card ticketing systems, the 
Opal card was in large part intended to improve the convenience of using public transport. This 
increased convenience was primarily achieved through removing the need to physically buy a paper 
ticket for every trip and by providing discounts for single fares compared to the equivalent paper tickets. 
However, although these objectives are frequently seen as motivations for introducing smart card 
ticketing systems, little research has been conducted to determine what effect they have on people’s 
travel patterns and behaviour (as distinct from changes to aggregate patronage levels). 
This paper uses data collected from residents of two inner-city areas of Sydney for one week in each 
of 2013 and 2014 to assess how the introduction of the Opal card influenced residents’ use of both 
public transport itself, and other modes. Uniquely in this paper, the phased approach to the 
implementation of the Opal card system created the conditions for a natural experiment that coincided 
with an ongoing, but largely unrelated, study collecting data on residents’ health and travel behaviour 
(Greaves et al., 2015). This allowed us to use variation in Opal card coverage as a source of exogenous 
variation in a differences-in-differences approach to identify the effect of interest. 
After this brief introduction, the remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
Sydney’s public transport ticketing system. Section 3 presents a literature review on smartcards 
ticketing systems as well as problems associated with measuring its effects. Section 4 describes the data 
and section 5 discusses the empirical strategy we adopt to identify the effect of Opal card on public 
transport behaviour. Section 6 and 7 presents results and discussion, respectively. Finally, section 8 
concludes. 
2. Sydney’s public transport ticketing systems 
 
2.1 Existing paper tickets and fare structure 
 
Sydney’s public transport system has used some form of automated and pre-paid ticketing system since 
the late 1980s (Byatt et al., 2007). The existing system in place when the initial phases of the Opal card 
were implemented was a system of paper tickets with a complex fare structure with hundreds of 
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combinations of fares for each mode of public transport. This included single, return (peak and off-
peak), ten-ride ("travel ten"), daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and yearly tickets on a single mode of 
transport sold either between specific locations or for trips within zones. Also available were a selection 
of multi-modal tickets (known as "My Multi" tickets) that allowed for travel on multiple modes of 
transport within set zones. My Multi tickets were available for daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and 
yearly durations. Sydney’s single light rail line operated a completely separate fare structure and 
ticketing system although My Multi tickets have been accepted since June 2011.1 
The longer duration tickets, travel ten and My Multi tickets were gradually phased out after the 
introduction of the Opal card although they were widely available at the time the data for this study 
were collected. 
2.2  Overview of the Opal card 
 
The initial work on a smart card ticketing system for Sydney’s public transport system began in the 
mid-1990s with the intention of having an operational system by the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games. 
That system, which became known as the T-Card, was eventually abandoned without ever being fully 
rolled out and was replaced by the Opal card project (Mulley and Moutou, 2015). 
2.2.1 Fare structure 
 
The fare structure used for Opal is primarily based on the concept of single distance-based fares for 
trips on a single mode of transport. Pricing is calculated based on the distance from the origin to the 
final destination on the same mode but allowing for transferring between routes or lines within one 
hour, and a 30 percent discount for off-peak train travel. There is no off-peak discount for other modes, 
including buses. The discount for off-peak train travel meant that it became cheaper to take the train 
during off-peak periods than buses for some routes, a reversal of the relative pricing in place with the 
paper tickets. To replace the existing paper-based daily and weekly tickets, the Opal fare structure 
applies maximum daily and weekly fares of $15 and $60 respectively for all trips regardless of mode. 
A maximum cap of $2.50 applies for travel on Sunday. 
One unique element of the Opal fare structure is that after eight “journeys” during a week2, all 
remaining trips are free3. The mode-specific fares mean that in the Opal fare structure there is a 
                                                          
1 The Sydney Monorail, operated by the same company as the Sydney Light Rail, was dismantled in June 2013 
and never accepted My Multi tickets. 
2 The Opal week is a fixed week starting on Monday. 
3 From September 2016 this will change to a 50% discount instead of free travel.  
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distinction made between a “trip” (trips made on a single mode with one hour transfer times) and a 
“journey” (trips made on all modes with one hour transfer times). This means that people who commute 
to and from work by public transport every weekday can travel for free from Friday, or earlier in the 
week if they make additional trips. Both the daily caps and the free trips after eight journeys apply only 
to paid trips where the Opal card was used. 
2.2.2  Roll-out and coverage 
 
The Opal card was trialed on one of Sydney’s ferry services in December 2012 before being introduced 
to the rest of Sydney’s Ferries in mid-2013. The Opal card first became available on the train in the 
Central Business District’s (CBD) City Circle line as well as the Eastern Suburbs line in June 2013 
followed by a small section of the North Shore line in August 2013 (see Figure 1). By March 2014 the 
Opal card was available at all of Sydney’s suburban railway stations. Although the Opal card was 
available on all ferries and at a small number of railway stations by August 2013 and the majority of 
railway stations by March 2014, the number of people using it remained very low with estimates of less 
than five percent of all trips taken using the Opal card by March 2014 (Saulwick, 2014). 
The Opal card was rolled out to Sydney’s buses in stages throughout 2014 with bus routes in the 
Inner West being among the last of the suburban bus routes to have the Opal card fully implemented. It 
was implemented on Sydney’s light rail line in December 2014. By the end of 2015, the Opal Card was 
available on most public transport routes in the Sydney Greater Metropolitan Area, with the exception 
of some private ferry and coach services. The Opal card can also be used on some intercity trains within 
New South Wales (NSW). 
3. Literature review 
 
3.1  Smartcard ticketing systems 
 
Although smart card technology has been around since the late 1960s, it was only in the late 1990s that 
it began to be used in public transport operations, with Korea’s UPASS and Hong Kong’s Octopus card 
in particular, leading the way. Since that time, smartcard systems have seen widespread adoption around 
the globe with hundreds of operational systems. Sydney has been somewhat of a laggard in adoption of 
the technology for reasons elaborated on in this paper. Most systems operate by users purchasing a 
smartcard, which can be used on any compatible public transport mode. The smartcard is typically 
prepaid and can be topped up automatically by linking to a credit/debit card or manually by paying 
online or in person at various outlets. In some cases, such as the Octopus card, the smartcard can also 
be used for a variety of other retail transactions. 
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Figure 1: Opal Rollout 
 
3.2  Benefits of smartcard systems 
 
In a recent review of smartcard ticketing systems, Pelletier et al. 2011, summarise the purported benefits 
and challenges of public transport smartcard systems drawing on a wide range of implementation 
evidence. Smartcards clearly offer many potential benefits to both users and operators over paper 
ticketing, which is why their usage has grown world-wide. From the user perspective, they remove the 
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need to physically buy a ticket and are much easier/quicker to use when boarding/alighting public 
transport. For instance, London’s Oyster cards were reported to increase boarding rates in London by 
four times, while Queensland’s GO card was reported to cut boarding times from 11 to 3 seconds 
(Tourism and Transport Forum, 2010). In turn, this has led to greater reported passenger satisfaction; 
for instance, following the introduction of the OPUS system in Montreal, overall satisfaction levels 
were reported at 90% with the technology (Société de transport de Montréal, 2009). 
For operators, this expedition of boardings means less delay to services and a potential increase in 
service frequency. Additionally, although there is a large capital cost associated with installing card 
readers at stations and on vehicles, evidence suggests that over time, the maintenance costs are 
substantially less than paper-ticketing systems (Pelletier et al., 2011). These savings are likely greater 
when comparing the cost of manufacturing and distributing a one-off plastic smartcard versus 
disposable tickets. It is also suggested smartcard systems are better suited to deterring fare evaders 
because of the link with individual information (Tourism and Transport Forum, 2010). However, this 
would only appear to be the case where the smartcard is registered to a user – most systems also allow 
purchase on an ad-hoc basis. 
An additional benefit is the wealth of detailed electronically-captured data on usage of public 
transport from a more substantial sample of the population than would typically be gathered from an 
on-board or household travel survey (Munizaga et al., 2014). In turn, these data can be utilised to map 
key performance indicators, patronage, travel patterns and network/service planning for operators. 
3.3  Challenges of smartcard systems 
 
Smartcard systems come with many challenges, particularly in the early stages of implementation where 
significant capital investment, software/hardware glitches, and buy-in of users are particular issues 
(Deakin and Kim, 2001). For instance, the much-lauded OPUS system in Montreal initially cost 
CDN$100 million and experienced many technical problems with readers (Pelletier et al., 2011). Hong 
Kong’s Octopus system was found to have problems with its electronic top-up service, which had 
affected around 15,270 transactions dating back seven years, costing commuters more than HK$3.7 
million (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007). For users, while smartcard systems make travel easier once 
the card is purchased, they do require people to remember to swipe on and in most cases off to get the 
correct fare as well as keep their account in credit. In practice, people do forget, particularly to swipe 
off, which is one reason why the London Oyster scheme moved to flat rate fare for certain services so 
passengers only have to swipe on. Privacy is also an inevitable issue that arises, given the provision of 
detailed travel information that can be linked to the registered owner of a card. 
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3.4  Barriers to mode switching 
 
Numerous studies have shown that certain mode characteristics are seen as barriers to switching modes, 
particularly from car to public transport. These include the perceived inconvenience of public transport, 
poor frequencies, the need to travel to multiple destinations (trip “chaining” our “tours”), the inability 
of public transport to accommodate adhoc decisions, etc. Arguably, several of these can be alleviated 
to some extent by the use of a smartcard ticketing system. 
3.5  Impacts of smartcard systems on ridership and mode switching 
 
While the general consensus appears to be that the benefits of smartcard systems outweigh the costs in 
comparison to paper ticketing options, the key question of interest here is whether this translates to 
increases in ridership.  Evidence is largely positive, but is hampered by the fact that the smartcard 
implementation is typically accompanied by various endogenous (e.g., changes in fare levels and 
structures, service changes) and exogenous factors (e.g., changes in costs of other modes, economic 
changes) that have often accompanied introduction (Public Transport Executive, 2009).  For instance, 
since the introduction of the Oyster card in London in 2003, bus patronage has risen by 56% and tube 
ridership by 21% (Thomas, 2013). However, over the same period, there have been major changes in 
transport operations, imposition of a congestion charge on cars, as well as significant socio-
demographic changes that have all had an impact. 
3.6  Quasi-experimental studies in travel 
 
Quasi-experimental studies have become increasingly popular for studying the dynamics of change in 
a field/natural setting (Greaves et al., 2015). Such studies are based on the classical experimental design 
where participants are divided into treatment/placebo and control groups and observed before and after 
the treatment. In a field setting, there are clearly many more challenges around the actual measurement 
of the phenomena of interest as well as identification of a clear ‘control’ group, from which the impacts 
of the intervention can truly be assessed. The current study presented somewhat of a unique opportunity, 
because there was a natural treatment group where Opal was introduced and a natural control group, 
where it was not. 
4. Data and sample 
 
The data used for this paper were collected from 435 participants living in two areas of inner-city 
Sydney as part of a large study aimed at evaluating how changes in the transport system in Inner Sydney 
impact the general health, well-being and travel choices of residents. (Greaves et al., 2015). Although 
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both areas are fairly similar to each other, as shown in Figure 2, only one had seen widespread 
implementation and adoption of the Opal card in 2014 when the second wave of data were collected. 
We refer to this area as the “intervention”. The other area was among the last parts of Sydney to see the 
Opal card introduced on its buses and the light rail line and for this reason can be considered a “control”. 
It must be acknowledged that participants in the “control” area were able to acquire an Opal card and 
use it on services in other areas (including all trains) by the second year of data collection. However, it 
must be emphasised that those living in the control area would need to pay twice if they changed from 
a non-Opal service (e.g., light rail) to an Opal service and would not get the benefit of free trips after 
eight journeys on trips made on non-Opal services. This, coupled with the widespread availability of 
multi-modal paper tickets at the time means it likely would have been more expensive for residents of 
the control area to use the Opal card than not use it. This is supported by estimates of the number of 
registered4 Opal cards by area during the data collection phase that showed a considerably lower 
proportion of registered Opal cards sent to addresses in the control area relative to the intervention. As 
such, although it is not possible to say conclusively that the participants in the control were not using 
the Opal card, it is likely that few were using the Opal card during the time the second year of data were 
collected. 
4.1  Sample and recruitment 
 
The sample used for this analysis includes only participants who provided usable data for all seven days 
during both years of the study. Since the primary objective of the study on which the analysis in this 
paper is conducted was the effect of bicycle infrastructure, the sample was limited to people aged 
between 18 and 55 years old5 and who did not have health problems that would prevent them from 
riding a bicycle. 
The sample was recruited using a variety of methods to ensure a reasonable representation of the 
population including on key demographic variables (age, gender and location). These methods included 
market research panels, cold calling, leaflets and intercept events as well as specific recruitment 
methods targeting specific groups (students and cyclists in particular). The final sample was composed 
of a total of 435 participants across both the control and the intervention areas (Greaves et al., 2015). A 
summary of the demographic characteristics of the final sample is shown in Table 1. 
 
                                                          
4 Opal cards can be ordered on the Opal website and sent to any address in Sydney. Towards the end of 2014 
unregistered Opal cards became available from selected retailers. 
5 Pensioner Opal cards, available to those over 60 were not available at the time. 
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Figure 2: Recruitment areas and Opal network 
4.2 Data 
 
The data collected from participants included both data on health and their perception of their usual 
travel, and a seven day online travel diary that provided detailed data on where, when, why and how 
participants travelled to all activities during a one-week period6. Crucial for public transport, multi-
modal trips were also recorded using the travel diary including access and egress modes and the time 
spent on each leg of the trip. For the purpose of this analysis, the total time and number of legs used for 
                                                          
6 The reader is referred to Greaves et al. 2014 for full details of the data collection.  
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each combination of mode, purpose and day per participant are used. The mean number of trip legs by 
bus, car/motorcycle, train and walk as an access/egress mode per person per week are shown in Figure 
3. Although there are differences between the control and intervention in terms of their original travel 
behaviour, the interest here is in the differences between the changes in the two groups. Given their 
relative proximity and similarities, notwithstanding the differences in the public transport modes 
available, it would be expected that the relative changes for both areas would be similar and yet walking 
as an access or egress mode increased in the intervention and went down (slightly) in the control. 
              Table 1: Summary of sample demographics 
  
Frequency 
 
Proportion 
 
Area 
  
Control 251 57.7% 
Intervention 184 42.3% 
 
Gender 
  
Female 277 61.1% 
Male 176 38.9% 
 
Age 
  
18-24 46 10.2% 
25-34 93 20.5% 
35-44 108 23.8% 
45-55 206 45.5% 
 
Income 
  
Less than $80k 130 33.3% 
$80k - $140k 122 31.3% 
More than $140k 138 35.4% 
Not stated 45  
Note: Although the incomes appear high, the study area is populated by people with higher than average 
incomes and these categories split the sample into roughly equal thirds. 
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Figure 3: Mean number of legs per person per week by mode 
 
 
5.      Empirical Strategy 
 
The focus of the analysis is to identify the average effect of the Opal Card on public transport use in 
inner-city Sydney. More specifically, we are interested in comparing outcomes related to car/motorcycle, 
bus, train, other public transport usage and active travel modes such as cycling and walking of 
individuals directly affected by the introduction of the Opal Card to what would have happened if the 
Opal card had not been introduced. Given outcomes for individuals in the intervention area (i.e. treatment 
group) in the absence of the Opal Card are never observed, this needs to be estimated. For this, consider 
the following simple difference-in-differences regression model: 
 
yidtm =  β0m + β1mOpalidtm + δim + δdm + δtm + ϵidtm                                                        (1) 
 
where yidtm represents the outcome variable for individual i in day of week d during period (i.e. before or 
after the introduction of Opal) t for mode of transport m. Opalidtm is an indicator variable that takes a 
value equal to 1 if the individual i was in the area affected by the Opal Card in period t, and 0 otherwise. 
The parameters δim, δdm and δtm are, respectively, individual, day of week and year fixed effects, and ϵidt is 
an error term. The parameter of interest, β1m, represents the effect of the introduction of the Opal Card on 
the outcome y for a given mode of transport. 
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The individual fixed effects (δim) included in the model control non-parametrically for unobservable 
individual-invariant characteristics, while the day of week fixed effects (δdm) and the year fixed effects 
(δtm) respectively control non-parametrically for day of week fixed differences in travelling behaviour 
and for yearly differences between outcome values (for example, fixed year differences within all 
individuals included in the sample). We interpret therefore the parameter of interest, β1m, as the causal 
effect of the Opal Card on public transport use; i.e., this coefficient represents the difference between 
the average of the outcome of interest after the introduction of the Opal Card minus the average of this 
outcome before the introduction of the Opal Card for the intervention and control areas: 
∆E(yidtm|δim, δdm, δtm, Opal)treated  − ∆E(yidtm|δim, δdm, δtm, Opal)untreated  = β1m   (2)   
Our difference-in-differences strategy have until now used variation within time and unit of 
treatment to identify the parameter of interest, using individual level fixed effects in all regressions. 
However, one possible concern is that the impact of Opal on transport use may not be homogeneous 
across individuals, but rather may vary as a function of the characteristics of the individuals. For 
example, the impact of introducing Opal may matter more for more educated individuals or for older 
individuals. In this case, simple difference-in-difference estimates that we described so far may suffer 
from two additional sources of bias (Heckman et al., 1997). The first bias may arise when there are 
some individuals who belong to the treated Opal region, but no comparable individual in found on the 
untreated region with similar observable characteristics, to provide a reasonable comparison unit. The 
second bias may arise from different distributions of the vector of observable variables that affect 
transport usage within the two regions. 
To account for that, we proceed in two ways. First, we estimate the models conditioning on important 
covariates, such as weekdays and weekends, work and non-work related trips, income, age and baseline 
self-reported main mode of transport used by the individual. Secondly, we match treated individuals 
(those with Opal) with untreated individuals (those in the control region) before treatment to balance a 
large set of observable attributes before implementing the differences-in-differences strategy. This is 
similar to the generalized difference-in-differences matching estimator proposed by Heckman et al. 
(1997) that extends conventional matching methods to longitudinal data and accounts not only for 
selection into treatment based on observable variables, given matching, but also accounts for selection 
into treatment on the basis of time-invariant unobservables, given individual level fixed effects. 
To briefly present the matching method, let there be two potential outcome variables for individual 
i, along the lines of Rubin (1974), such that after treatment period we observe: 
𝑦𝑖 =  {
𝑦𝑖1, if 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 1
𝑦0𝑖 , if 𝑂𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 0
                                                                                                                  (3) 
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where y1i is the outcome under the presence of Opal and y0i is the outcome without Opal. The causal 
effect of the treatment (Opalidt = 1) relative to the control (Opalidt = 0) is defined as the difference 
between the corresponding potential outcomes β1i = y1i − y0i. 
Here, we focus on the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) which is defined as 
βAT T =   E[β1i|Opal = 1] = E[y1i − y0i|Opal = 1]                                                              (4)  
The problem in estimating equation (4) arises from the fact that comparisons of two outcomes for 
the same individual, when exposed and when not exposed to the treatment, is an unfeasible task, as the 
same individual can either be treated or not in the same time period (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
That is, we only observe one of the two potential outcomes given treatment status, yi = y0i + (y1i − 
y0i)Opalidt. 
The objective of the matching procedure, therefore, is to find different individuals (some treated and 
some not) such that after adjusting for differences in observed characteristics, or pretreatment variables, 
comparisons can be made (Angrist and Pishcke, 2009). In other words, the procedure will construct a 
control group such that observable characteristics are balanced in comparison to treated individuals 
(Oliveira et al., 2015). This is precisely the intuition behind the matching that, under the conditional 
independence (CIA) or unconfoundedness assumption (Rubin, 1974; Heckman and Robb Jr., 1985), 
imply that treatment assignment is independent of potential outcomes conditional on a set of covariates 
X or, as shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a,b), on the propensity score, p(X), defined as the 
conditional probability of being treated, Prob(Opal = 1|X). In this case, the ATT is obtained by 
βAT T =  E[β1i|Opal = 1, p(Xi)] = E[y1i − y0i|Opal = 1, p(Xi)]                                                        (5) 
We will estimate the propensity score via a logit specification with the dependent variable being 1 
for the treated region and 0 otherwise. Independent variables include several personal characteristics, 
such as age, income, education, and controls for transport usage before the introduction of the Opal 
card. After we obtain parameter estimates, we will use them to predict treatment probabilities or 
propensity scores for individual i belonging to the treated Opal region. Once propensity scores are 
available, we follow the approach carried out by Deng et al. (2012) and match each treated individual 
to a close untreated counterpart to obtain more reliable estimates of the effect of interest. Note that this 
implies significant reductions to sample size. 
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6. Results 
 
The results of the estimated models are presented in the following tables. The estimates in these tables 
should be interpreted as the mean number of minutes per day that each person in the intervention group 
spent travelling (on a particular mode) relative to how the same person would have travelled had the 
Opal card not been introduced. 
The estimates for work and non-work trips for weekdays and weekends are shown in Table 2. The 
results show that there was a statistically significant reduction in car use for both work and non-work 
travel on both weekdays and weekends. The reduction in car use was about 10 minutes per day per 
person during weekdays for work trips, and weekends for non-work trips. These reductions are offset 
by an increase of a similar magnitude to the total of both train and walking to public transport for work 
trips on weekdays. The effect of the Opal card on bus use were only significant for non-work weekend 
travel. 
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Table 2: Estimates for Work and non-Work related trips in the intervention area 
 
Mode of Transp. Weekdays Weekends 
 
  
Work 
 
Non-work 
 
Work 
 
Non-work 
 
Car/Motorcycle 
 
-10.156 
 
-5.962 
 
-1.924 
 
-9.646 
 (1.997)*** (1.791)*** (0.976)** (3.256)*** 
 
Bus 
 
-1.691 
 
0.906 
 
-0.286 
 
1.643 
 (1.284) (0.626) (0.429) (0.965)* 
 
Train 
 
6.306 
 
2.315 
 
0.141 
 
2.980 
 (1.303)*** (0.489)*** (0.240) (0.763)*** 
 
Walk to Public Transp. 
 
4.771 
 
2.052 
 
0.184 
 
3.584 
 (1.262)*** (0.642)*** (0.350) (1.211)*** 
 
Other Public Transp. 
 
-0.580 
 
1.216 
 
-0.189 
 
0.775 
 (0.421) (0.387)*** (0.165) (0.600) 
 
Walk Only 
 
3.295 
 
-0.611 
 
0.816 
 
1.525 
 (1.465)** (1.335) (0.567) (2.250) 
 
Bicycle 
 
0.061 
 
2.524 
 
-0.131 
 
5.086 
 (0.917) (0.748)*** (0.230) (2.237)** 
 
Other Transp. 
 
-0.446 
 
1.339 
 
-0.203 
 
1.591 
 (0.441) (0.442)*** (0.171) (0.655)** 
 
Year fixed effect 
Day of week fixed effect 
Individual fixed effect 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively. 
Interpretation: Estimates represent mean number of minutes per day per person travelling on each mode 
relative to the same person if the Opal Card had not been introduced. 
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Table 3 presents results differentiated by income category. The reduction of car use and increase in 
train use and walk-access generally holds across the income groups with the largest effects on work-
trips for those with medium incomes, and on non-work trips for those with high incomes. However, 
those with higher incomes were more likely to switch from car to train for work trips while those with 
medium incomes were also likely to switch to walking only (as well as trains). 
Table 3: Estimates for work and non-Work related trips by income 
 
Mode of Transp. 
  
Work 
   
Non-work 
 
  
Low Income 
 
Med. Income 
 
High Income 
 
Low. Income 
 
Med. Income 
 
High Income 
 
Car/Motorcycle 
 
-7.403 
 
-9.776 
 
-6.914 
 
-3.578 
 
-5.665 
 
-8.464 
 (2.809)*** (3.389)*** (2.131)*** (3.207) (3.048)* (2.925)*** 
Bus -0.716 -2.771 -1.518 0.904 0.875 1.154 
 (1.713) (1.786) (1.470) (1.167) (1.132) (0.738) 
Train 3.639 3.323 6.438 2.358 2.172 2.748 
 (1.293)*** (1.544)** (1.852)*** (0.971)** (0.734)*** (0.626)*** 
Walk to Public Transp. 2.338 2.023 4.485 2.919 1.333 2.498 
 (1.872) (1.694) (1.474)*** (1.434)** (1.117) (0.844)*** 
Other Public Transp. -0.208 -0.665 -0.748 1.253 0.527 1.479 
 (0.521) (0.525) (0.484) (0.673)* (0.643) (0.530)*** 
Walk Only 0.978 5.814 1.354 -0.274 -0.596 1.432 
 (2.152) (2.409)** (1.610) (2.360) (2.007) (2.324) 
Bicycle -0.201 -1.023 1.371 2.894 2.482 4.925 
 (0.793) (1.287) (1.263) (1.401)** (1.801) (1.955)** 
Other Transp. -0.486 -0.304 -0.512 0.689 1.164 2.099 
 (0.502) (0.554) (0.553) (0.931) (0.702)* (0.559)*** 
 
Year fixed effect 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Day of week fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively. 
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The results of the model estimating the effects of the Opal card based on age had more significant 
differences (Table 4). Because there are large similarities between adjoining age groups, the estimates 
shown here are only for those younger than 25 years old and 45-55 years old. The results show that 
those in the older age category had a statistically significant reduction in car use for both work and non-
work trips. Participants aged younger than 25 years old made a significant switch between buses and 
trains for work trips but also an increase for train for non-work weekend trips. In contrast to age and 
income, the models for gender showed no significant differences in terms of the effect of the Opal card. 
Table 4: Estimates for Work and non-Work related trips by Age 
 
Mode of Transp. Weekdays Weekends 
 
Work Non-work Work Non-Work 
 
  
18-24 yrs 
 
45-55 yrs 
 
18-24 yrs 
 
45-55 yrs 
 
18-24 yrs 
 
45-55 yrs 
 
18-24 yrs 
 
45-55 yrs 
 
Car/Motorcycle 
 
-3.170 
 
-10.279 
 
-2.072 
 
-7.587 
 
-2.942 
 
-2.340 
 
3.969 
 
-12.943 
 (4.462) (3.752)*** (3.503) (3.518)** (1.921) (1.377)* (7.953) (5.060)** 
Bus -7.192 -1.986 -0.514 1.273 -4.715 0.167 0.223 -0.950 
 (3.446)** (1.752) (1.905) (1.159) (2.609)* (0.178) (2.563) (1.554) 
Train 6.555 4.492 1.935 2.631 -0.230 0.329 5.165 1.674 
 (2.759)** (1.971)** (1.241) (0.841)*** (1.095) (0.269) (1.976)** (1.282) 
Walk to Public Transp. 2.963 4.980 1.010 3.173 -1.860 0.375 4.203 2.529 
 (2.774) (2.562)* (1.678) (1.153)*** (1.840) (0.378) (1.907)** (2.477) 
Other Public Transp. -0.649 -0.656 1.715 1.078 -1.074 0.167 0.526 -0.347 
 (0.894) (0.677) (0.945)* (0.706) (0.809) (0.178) (1.709) (1.012) 
Walk Only 1.012 6.393 2.164 0.522 3.647 -0.100 0.776 1.023 
 (2.951) (2.576)** (3.273) (2.343) (3.317) (0.251) (3.341) (4.058) 
Bicycle -1.143 1.962 2.569 2.331 -0.889 0.133 -0.493 4.620 
 (1.430) (1.876) (1.244)** (1.283)* (0.862) (0.326) (2.512) (3.821) 
Other Transp. -1.041 0.157 0.915 1.003 -0.759 0.067 -0.426 0.034 
 (0.866) (0.735) (1.219) (0.770) (0.825) (0.197) (1.613) (0.968) 
 
Year fixed effect 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Day of week fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively. 
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A key issue is whether the changes in public transport use are occurring as a consequence of ‘new’ 
users taking advantage of public transport or if existing users are making greater use of the network. As 
expected, the results (shown in Table 5) for the effects of the Opal card by each participant’s self-
reported primary mode of transport to work/study before the Opal card differs both in magnitude and 
significance. The strongest effects were observed for individuals whose most common mode of travel 
to work was public transport before the intervention (column headings in Table 5). Specifically, less 
car and bus use and more train use was observed after the intervention relative to the before. This is 
corroborated by examining the proportions of public transport users in the intervention area before and 
after the introduction of the Opal card. Results showed that 58% of participants were existing users of 
public transport, 13% were new users, while 11% no longer used public transport. The remaining 17% 
of participants in the intervention area did not use public transport at all during the study. This suggests 
that the increased use of public transport is primarily being driven by existing users of the network. 
Table 5: Estimates for weekday work and non-work related trips by original main mode of transport to work/study 
 
Mode of Transp.  
 
Work    
 
Non-work  
  
Pub.  Transp. 
 
Car/Moto 
 
Bicycle 
 
Walk 
 
Pub.  Transp. 
 
Car/Moto 
 
Bicycle 
 
Walk 
 
Car/Motorcycle 
 
-3.870 
 
-11.194 
 
0.102 
 
-7.570 
 
0.858 
 
-4.281 
 
-2.703 
 
-8.649 
 (2.217)* (5.598)** (3.864) (1.830)*** (2.226) (4.949) (3.733) (3.321)** 
Bus -8.289 1.179 1.732 0.064 0.238 0.315 -1.646 0.624 
 (2.630)*** (1.936) (2.604) (2.526) (1.231) (0.983) (1.343) (1.094) 
Train 9.160 4.118 2.326 4.957 2.403 0.575 0.959 2.260 
 (2.402)*** (2.396)* (4.003) (2.433)** (0.934)** (0.912) (1.073) (0.751)*** 
Walk to Public Transp. 5.214 3.022 0.013 4.474 2.456 0.377 -0.466 0.080 
 (2.334)** (2.238) (2.584) (2.169)** (1.245)* (0.938) (1.174) (1.116) 
Other Public Transp. -1.552 1.599 1.011 -1.163 0.751 0.344 0.838 1.099 
 (0.854)* (0.760)** (0.846) (0.677)* (0.639) (0.886) (0.925) (0.764) 
Walk Only -0.322 3.607 -0.084 4.446 1.128 0.809 2.252 -8.510 
 (1.423) (2.480) (1.208) (4.535) (2.109) (3.068) (3.110) (3.122)*** 
Bicycle -0.845 0.992 4.105 -1.633 2.535 0.733 4.827 0.040 
 (0.957) (0.973) (4.704) (1.250) (1.001)** (1.144) (2.843)* (1.750) 
Other Transp. -1.625 2.010 1.144 -1.184 0.950 0.827 0.120 0.946 
 (0.906)* (0.731)*** (1.279) (0.705)* (0.723) (0.992) (1.737) (0.773) 
 
Year fixed effect 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Day of week fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes:  Robust Standard errors in parentheses.  ***, ** and * represent p<1%, p<5% and p<10% respectively. 
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6.1 Propensity Score 
 
We now move to our estimation of the propensity score. The purpose of this exercise is to determine 
how similar those in the intervention group are to the control group based on personal characteristics. 
We decided to include in the vector of controls all observed characteristics that may jointly determine 
both treatment (Opal) and outcome (time travelling on a particular mode). As argued in Section 5, this 
strategy may help in constructing a control group that is balanced in comparison to those in the 
intervention group in terms of observable characteristics. 
Results for the propensity score logistic specification (logit model) are reported in table 6. 
Individuals in the intervention area are evidently younger, earn higher incomes and less likely to be 
students compared to those in the control area. However, they are quite similar in terms of gender, 
working status and education level. Our specification also includes variables related to baseline 
transport choices, to account for initial levels of public/private transport usage. Hence, we include for 
each mode of transport the time spent travelling before any intervention took place. As can be observed, 
coefficients are quite small, although statistically significant for a few modes. This highlights potential 
gains from using the matching approach we implement here. In this case, participants in the intervention 
group can be matched to similar participants in the control group thereby controlling for any remaining 
differences between the composition of the intervention group relative to the control group. 
Before presenting the propensity score matching (PSM) results, however, we assess whether the 
implemented matching procedure has been effective in balancing observable variables. As emphasised 
by Dehejia and Wahba 2002, a matching procedure will be successful if members in the selected control 
group (matched sample) have similar observable characteristics (variables included in the vector of 
covariates) when compared to the intervention group. 
Table 6 contains statistics that summarise the quality of the PSM implementation. In the second 
column of Table 7, which displays the pseudo R2 from the estimation of the conditional treatment 
probability (propensity score) on both raw and matched samples 
 (i.e., before and after matching), we first show that the model has significantly less power to explain 
treatment status after matching. Pseudo R2 presented a reduction of about 80%. This is confirmed by 
the Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test of the joint insignificance of all the regressors in column 3, which also 
suggests that the matched sample is well balanced in the observed variables. Finally, substantial 
reduction in mean and median absolute bias (intervention versus control differences in covariate means 
and medians before and after matching), as computed in Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985, is achieved 
(columns 4 and 5). Both present a reduction of about 70% and 65%, respectively. This means that the 
demographic characteristics of the matched sample do not predict the area (intervention or control) in 
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which they live. This is good because it means the sample in each area are not characteristically different 
from each other and can, therefore, be reasonable compared. 
We now analyse results for the propensity score matching (PSM) estimation in Table 8. As one may 
observe, results are quite similar to the ones presented in table 2, although coefficient estimates are 
slightly smaller and standard deviations are slightly larger (as expected, given smaller sample sizes7), 
making some of our parameters statistically insignificant. Empirical implications, however, are mostly 
left unchanged: car usage decreases for work related activities on weekdays and non-work related 
activities on weekends; total train and walk to public transport increases; and bus usage increases for 
non-work weekend travel. These results not only reinforce our conclusions regarding the policy, but 
also adds credibility to our empirical findings given both strategies deliver similar implications.8 
Table 6: Matching logit: regression of Opal on all other covariates for intervention relative to control 
Variables Estimates stand. dev. 
Age -0.050 (0.013)*** 
Male 0.411 (0.251) 
Income less than $80k -0.734 (0.323)** 
Income $80k-$140k -0.881 (0.301)*** 
Student -1.164 (0.530)** 
Part-time Worker -0.241 (0.453) 
Full-time Worker -0.135 (0.432) 
Tertiary Degree -0.251 (0.730) 
High School 0.015 (0.753) 
Car/M oto - work related -0.004 (0.001)*** 
Car/M oto - non-work related -0.002 (0.001)** 
Bus - work related -0.004 (0.002)** 
Bus - non-work related -0.011 (0.004)*** 
T rain - work related 0.005 (0.002)** 
T rain - non-work related 0.008 (0.006) 
W alkP T - work related 0.001 (0.002) 
W alkP T - non-work related 0.005 (0.004) 
OtherP T - work related -0.027 (0.012)** 
OtherP T - non-work related -0.028 (0.015)* 
Constant 3.384 (1.051)*** 
N 435  
Note:  *** represents p<1%, ** represents p<5%, and * represents p<10%. 
                                                          
7 With a matched sample each person in the intervention area is matched to one similar person in the control area. 
Since there were slightly fewer participants in the intervention area (see table 1), non- matched individuals in the 
control area were dropped in the matched sample. 
8 Results via matching were also similar for tables 2-5, which we do not report to save space.  They are however 
available upon request. 
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 Work Non-work Work Non-work 
Car/Moto -5.892 -1.358 -1.270 -4.008 
 (2.265)*** (1.991) (1.100) (3.952) 
Bus 0.150 0.022 0.234 1.898 
 (1.370) (0.745) (0.355) (1.090)* 
Train 5.267 1.467 0.193 2.975 
 (1.570)*** (0.579)** (0.301) (0.860)*** 
Walk to Public Transp. 5.259 0.833 0.328 3.883 
 (1.491)*** (0.803) (0.411) (1.348)*** 
Other Public Transp. -0.358 0.751 -0.149 0.793 
 (0.483) (0.444)* (0.235) (0.703) 
Walk Only 1.777 -2.549 0.874 1.501 
 (1.663) (1.727) (0.631) (2.724) 
Bicycle -0.546 2.105 0.084 3.883 
 (1.146) (0.813)** (0.276) (2.595) 
Other Transp. -0.676 0.600 -0.076 1.697 
 (0.535) (0.582) (0.238) (0.761)** 
Year fixed effect 
Day of week fixed effect 
Individual fixed effect 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Table 7: Balance quality before (Raw) and after (Match) matching 
Sample Pseudo R2 LR χ2 Mean Bias Median Bias 
Raw 0.235 139.45∗∗∗ 26.2 19.9 
Match 0.045 22.88 8.0 6.8 
Note: *** represents p<1%. The mean and median bias serve as summary indicators of the distribution of the 
absolute bias and are calculated as treated versus control differences in covariate means and medians before and 
after matching. 
Table 8:  Estimates for Work and non-Work related trips - Matched sample 
               Mode of Transp. Weekdays Weekends 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent p<1%, p<5%, and p<10% respectively. 
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7. Discussion 
 
The results presented in Section 6 show that the effects of the Opal card on travel behaviour varies quite 
substantially by a number of different factors including the type of trip and the day of the week as well 
as some (but not all) personal characteristics. However, even at the aggregate level the introduction of 
the Opal system has coincided with significant changes in the use of most modes of transport. In 
particular, there is a strong and significant effect of people switching from cars (and motorcycles) to 
public transport, in particular to train travel. This travel is replaced with a similar amount of time spent 
using public transport and walking to access public transport. Although to be expected, the link between 
increases in public transport use and walking, either as an access/egress mode or as a stand-alone mode, 
is particularly positive given the health benefits of even relatively short amounts of walking (Pucher 
and Dijkstra, 2003). 
The effects of Opal appear to be most pronounced for work trips on weekdays and non-work trips 
on weekends with reductions of around 10 minutes in car trips per day per person. In part, this is likely 
to be a result of the incentive of free trips after eight journeys that means those who commute to work 
by public transport during the week travel for free on weekends. Although many of these weekend trips 
are likely to be free for the user, there is undoubtedly a societal benefit from reducing car use for 
discretionary trips particularly since these trips have had relatively high car mode share in Sydney 
relative to commuting trips (Greaves et al., 2015). 
For people whose stated main mode of travel to work (or study) was public transport, there was a 
significant shift in mode from bus to train for work trips. This was coupled with an increase in walking 
to public transport suggesting that people chose to walk further to access the train. There are two 
possible reasons for this effect. The first is that the Opal fare structure meant that for some trips in off-
peak periods, the train became cheaper than the bus. However, since this effect was primarily for work 
trips, for which travel is largely during peak periods, this cannot fully explain the effect. Likely a more 
important reason for this effect is the removal of multi-modal tickets (the “My Multi” tickets). This 
means commuters who change modes pay two fares but these count for only one “journey” towards the 
eight required for free travel. This appears to have had the effect of commuters choosing to walk (on 
average further) to a railway station rather than first taking a bus then transferring to a train. 
Nonetheless, even for commuters whose primary mode of travel to work was public transport before 
the Opal card, the number of trips by car reduced (albeit only at the 0.1 significance level). 
The differences in the effects of the Opal card between people of different ages and incomes provides 
further insights into the switching from car to public transport and from bus to train. The reduction in 
car use for those older than 44 years old in contrast to those younger than 25 who do not reduce their 
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use of car suggests that the Opal card was successful in encouraging people who were previously less 
likely to use public transport to commute by train. Those older than 44 were as likely to switch to 
walking only as to the train. However, the switching from bus to train travel by those younger than 25 
suggests that the effect of the Opal card on younger people (who are less likely to own a car) is one of 
switching between modes of public transport. That it is primarily age (rather than income) that is driving 
the effect of the Opal card on commuting trips is supported by the relative consistency of the effect by 
income for work trips (in contrast to the larger changes for those with high incomes for non-work trips). 
It must be acknowledged that it is not possible in the context of this study to differentiate between 
the effect of the Opal card itself from the effect of the fare structure. However, it can be argued that a 
new (and frequently simpler) fare structure is an inherent feature of smartcard ticketing systems for 
public transport. Few, if any, major public transport systems retained the original fare structure (and 
pricing) of the system when the smartcard ticketing system was introduced. Nonetheless, the results in 
Section 6 and this discussion should be interpreted as the effects of the Opal card system as a whole 
including both the method of payment (i.e., the Opal card) and the accompanying fare structure. 
Furthermore, although the results presented here provide some evidence that the fare structure 
influences the exact effect of the smartcard ticketing system (e.g., by promoting or discouraging multi-
modal trips), it is unlikely that changes to the fare structure would result in as large a switch from car 
to public transport for those who did not use public transport previously. 
Placing these results in a wider context, this analysis adds to the generally positive view of Smartcard 
systems from cities that have implemented them. While much of the policy focus has been on improving 
service levels and coverage, reducing the barriers associated with complicated, cumbersome ticketing 
systems appears to be integral to encouraging ridership. It is true that despite the positives, Smartcard 
systems such as Opal still present many barriers particularly to the millions of annual visitors to Sydney. 
One obvious evolution is to provide greater flexibility in the use of personal credit cards (now 
operational in London) and mobile phone apps. A trial with contactless payment with credit and debit 
cards has been announced for 2017 (Transport for NSW, 2016). This may also make it easier to convert 
some non-users to incidental users meaning that someone may use public transport on an ad-hoc basis 
if it is more convenient than waiting for a lift or a taxi. 
8. Conclusions 
 
Smartcard and other forms of electronic ticketing have become integral to modern public transport 
systems around the globe testament to their touted benefits outweighing the challenges of 
implementation. However, while aggregate ridership figures have generally been positive, little is 
known about the drivers behind these changes because of a lack of travel information on individuals 
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before and after implementation of such systems. Utilising a panel survey of inner-city residents that 
coincided with the phased introduction of the Opal smartcard system and associated changes in fare 
structures in Sydney, the current paper uses a differences-in-differences methodology to provide 
evidence of significant changes in mode choice. Of most note, is the changes appear to have encouraged 
people from private cars to public transport, although this is primarily towards the train as opposed to 
bus. In turn this has led to other positive outcomes, including an increase in (incidental) walking to 
access/egress public transport. That this switching is observed across income groups is particularly 
encouraging, because it suggests the changes have also spread to higher income groups, who are 
generally the most resistant to switch to public  transport. 
As with any study of this nature, there are acknowledged limitations. First, naturalistic field 
experiments such as this, invariably suffer from endogenous (fare structure, system changes) and 
exogenous (economic changes) effects over and above the intervention as identified in Section 3. The 
incorporation of a control area and the methodology employed attempted to deal to with the exogenous 
effects, while the endogenous effects are (arguably) an inherent component of smartcard introductions 
as discussed in the previous section. Second, it must be stressed, the sample were drawn from inner-
Sydney, where multi-modal transport options are generally available – the situation is quite different in 
the auto-dominated middle and outer suburbs of the city, where significant public transport is needed 
above and beyond the improvement of the ticketing system. Finally, the extent to which the changes 
are sustained over time is clearly crucial, particularly in view of other planned system or fare changes. 
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